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CHAPTER FIVE 
————————————————————————————————— 
KEY CHALLENGES RELATING TO THE GOVERNANCE OF REGIONAL 
FISHERIES   
 
James Harrison 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
International law calls for cooperation in the conservation and management of fish 
stocks, although it does not specify the precise form that such cooperation must take.1 
Generally speaking, states have chosen to pursue cooperation at the regional level, in 
order to allow them to respond to the varying ecological, geographical and political 
particularities of each individual fishery. Most regional fisheries cooperation takes 
place through some type of international institution, generically referred to as a regional 
fisheries body (RFB). 2  Yet, the functions of RFBs vary from the collection and 
dissemination of data to the adoption of legally binding conservation and management 
measures (CMMs). It is this latter form of cooperation that is of particular interest in 
the present Chapter, as it offers the best chances of ensuring the effective management 
of the world’s fish stocks.  
The purpose of this Chapter is to explore the key trends in regional fisheries 
management and the extent to which a comprehensive, coherent and effective system 
of regional fisheries governance has emerged since the entry into force of the LOS 
Convention.3 The focus of the Chapter is on the regulation of high seas fisheries, 
including straddling and highly migratory stocks. The Chapter will question the extent 
to which common trends have emerged in relation to such governance arrangements. It 
will address five key issues that are critical to the effective functioning of regional 
fisheries regulation, namely: drivers of regional fisheries cooperation (Section 2); 
institutional form (Section 3); decision-making procedures (Section 4); dispute 
settlement (Section 5); and inter-institutional cooperation (Section 6).4 The conclusions 
in Section 7 will draw together the overall trends in this field and will suggest that there 
are signs of increasing systematization evident through emerging principles by which 
all RFBs are judged, as well as increasing collaboration between RFBs in order to 
promote shared goals.  
 
 
2. KEY DRIVERS OF REGIONAL FISHERIES REFORM 
 
Whilst fisheries cooperation can be traced back to the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries,5 there is little doubt that cooperation in this field has intensified 
since the 1990s when broader considerations of sustainability emerged as an 
                                                 
1  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (LOS Convention; 1833 
UNTS 3), Arts. 63, 64 and 118.  
2  This is an umbrella term used by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; see 
<http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/16800/en>. 
3  See note 1. The LOS Convention entered into force on 16 November 1994.  
4  See also Chapter 6 of this Volume (Molenaar). 
5  See e.g. K. Bangert “Fisheries Agreements” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law On-line Edition (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2008). 
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international priority.6 The political impetus generated by events such as the 1992 Rio 
Conference on Environment and Development led to further developments in the global 
legal framework for international fisheries management, as well as to reform of regional 
fisheries regimes.  
 One of the most important developments in international fisheries law following 
the Rio Conference was the adoption of the Fish Stocks Agreement.7 Much of the 
Agreement is concerned with improving the governance of fisheries at the regional or 
subregional level, in order to ensure transparent, timely and effective decision-making.8 
The Fish Stocks Agreement itself explicitly calls for the establishment of new 
subregional and regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements where 
none exist9 and the strengthening of existing organizations and arrangements in order 
to improve their effectiveness.10 The principles and policy goals in this Agreement, as 
reinforced by subsequent international instruments,11 declarations12 and meetings,13 
not only provide a check-list for evaluating the functioning of fisheries cooperation, but 
they also provide an important baseline for states when negotiating the establishment 
of new cooperative mechanisms, whether they apply to straddling and highly migratory 
stocks or discrete high seas stocks.14  
 In practice, the follow-up to the Rio Conference and the Fish Stocks Agreement has 
seen both reform of existing regional fisheries treaties to reflect modern governance 
principles, as well as the establishment of new fisheries treaties to cover new and 
emerging fisheries. All of these developments have confirmed RFBs as the main 
vehicle for managing high seas fisheries. In particular, a key shift in this post-Rio period 
has been a trend towards the establishment of mechanisms to agree upon legally binding 
CMMs for high seas fish stocks, largely through the establishment of regional fisheries 
management organizations or arrangements (RFMO/As).15  
 Significant steps have been taken to fill gaps in the regulatory framework for high 
seas fisheries, although some gaps remain. 16  In part, gaps arise because existing 
                                                 
6  See discussion in e.g. Y. Takei Filling Regulatory Gaps in High Seas Fisheries (Brill, Leiden: 2013) 
88-111. 
7  Agreement for the implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks of 4 August 1995 (2167 UNTS 3). 
8  Ibid., Arts. 10(j) and 12. 
9  Ibid., Art. 8(5). 
10  Ibid., Art. 13. 
11  See e.g. 1995 FAO Code of Conduct on Responsible Fisheries, para. 6.12; 2001 International Plan 
of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, paras. 78-
83. 
12  2001 Reykjavik Declaration on Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Environment, para. 3; 2005 St 
John’s Declaration on the Governance of High Seas Fisheries, paras. 1, 4; 2005 Rome Declaration 
on IUU Fishing, para. 5. 
13  See e.g. Report of the Meeting of FAO and Non-FAO Regional Fishery Bodies or Arrangements 
(FAO Fisheries Report No. 597: 1999) para. 41(v). 
14  See e.g. R. Barnes and C. Massarella “High Seas Fisheries” in E. Morgera and K. Kulovesi (eds) 
Research Handbook on International Law and Natural Resources (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham: 
2016) 374; Takei, note 6 at 152-153. 
15  J. Swan “Decision-Making in Regional Fisheries Bodies or Arrangements: The Evolving Role of 
RFBs and International Agreement on Decision-Making Processes” (FAO Fisheries Circular No. 
995: 2004) 10; Takei, note 6 at 205-272. See below for discussion of the differences between 
RFMOs and RFMAs. 
16  United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Res. 71/123 of 7 December 2016, para. 140; Report of 
the 2016 Resumed Fish Stocks Agreement Review Conference, doc A/CONF.210/2016/5 of 1 
August 2016, Outcomes, para. A18. 
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RFMO/As may not necessarily cover all of the relevant species that are fished in the 
region. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has particularly highlighted 
the need to ensure the mandates of RFMO/As cover bottom fisheries.17 In other areas, 
the relevant RFBs may not have a mandate to adopt legally binding CMMs for the fish 
stocks under their purview. For example, in the Central and South-West Atlantic and 
the Central Eastern Atlantic, the two existing regional fisheries institutions do not 
possess the power to adopt legally binding management measures, although discussions 
are ongoing about upgrading these bodies to address this shortcoming.18 In some areas, 
there is simply a lack of institutions. Whilst coverage is generally considered to be good 
for tuna and tuna-like species, the situation for other fish stocks is patchier. One gap 
relates to certain parts of the Central Pacific, in areas that fall between the mandates of 
the North Pacific Fisheries Commission (NPFC) and the South Pacific Regional 
Fisheries Management Organization (SPRFMO). The situation is more complex in the 
South-West Atlantic, where proposals have been made for the establishment of an 
RFMO to fill a gap in fisheries regulation, but they have been resisted by coastal States 
in the region, in part due to on-going territorial disputes.19 Finally, there is a gap for all 
fish species in the central Arctic Ocean, where the ice is retreating and opening up new 
fishing grounds. Although there is not yet any commercial fishing in these areas, there 
are on-going negotiations on how to address this situation in a pre-emptive manner.20  
Alongside the drive towards comprehensive regulatory coverage, the international 
community has also stressed the need to ensure that institutions are effective in 
fulfilling the mandate that they have been given. Momentum for performance reviews 
of RFBs began in 2005, when the twenty-sixth session of the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO)’s Committee on Fisheries agreed to “extend an 
invitation to RFMO members and other interested parties encouraging them to 
participate in the development of parameters for any such review process.”21 These 
discussions were followed up in the 2005 UNGA Fisheries Resolution, which 
“[e]ncourage[d] States, through their participation in regional fisheries management 
organizations and arrangements, to initiate processes for their performance review.”22 
The North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) was amongst the first 
RFMOs to undertake a performance review23 using criteria developed by its Working 
Group on the Future of NEAFC.24  In particular, the review took into account the 
                                                 
17  UNGA Res. 59/25 of 17 November 2004, para. 68. See also Chapter 8 of this Volume (Caddell).  
18  For discussion, see Fishery Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic (CECAF) Performance 
Review (2012) para. 21; K. Hoydal “Findings of the Independent Cost-Benefit Assessment of the 
Options for Strategic Re-Orientation of WECAFC” (FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular No. 
1117: 2016). 
19  See A. Bensch et al “Worldwide Review of Bottom Fisheries in the High Seas” (FAO Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Technical Paper No. 522/Rev.1: 2009) 62.  
20  A process is ongoing in relation to the high seas of the central Arctic Ocean; see 
<https://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/rls/269126.htm>. For a discussion of the background to this 
process, see E.J. Molenaar “International Regulation of Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries”, in M. 
Nordquist, J. Moore, R. Long (eds) Challenges of the Changing Arctic. Continental Shelf, 
Navigation, and Fisheries (Brill, Leiden: 2016) 429-463. 
21  Report of the Twenty-Sixth Meeting of the Committee on Fisheries (FAO Fisheries Report R780: 
2005) para. 112. 
22  UNGA Res. 60/31 of 29 November 2005, para 60. See also UNGA Res. 61/105 of 8 December 
2006, para. 73 and the Report of the 2006 Fish Stocks Agreement Review Conference, doc 
A/CONF.210/2006/15 of 5 July 2006, Outcome, para. 32(j).  
23  The North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO) had undertaken a performance 
review in 2004-2005, although this was an internal exercise linked to reform of the organization. 
24  Report of the 2006 NEAFC Performance Review. 
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manner in which NEAFC had performed in several core areas with reference to relevant 
international treaties and other instruments, including the LOS Convention and the Fish 
Stocks Agreement. Most RFMO/As have now carried out at least one performance 
review, many following a similar model to NEAFC.25 Yet, there are key differences 
between the processes, particularly when it comes to the composition of the review 
panel. Whilst some RFMO/As involve a mixture of internal and external experts,26 
others have opted for the appointment of a completely independent panel composed of 
experts in fisheries management, fisheries science and the law of the sea.27 This latter 
approach arguably increases the rigor of the assessment process by minimizing any 
influence that the organization may have upon the findings. Nevertheless, many 
RFMO/As continue to stress the benefit of including representatives of the organization 
in order to provide some internal knowledge and guidance as to how cooperation works 
within the region.28 The reviews also differ in the manner in which they engage with 
external stakeholders and civil society. Many RFMO/As have chosen to actively 
consult stakeholders as part of the review process and some have gone as far as 
including a representative from a non-governmental organization (NGO) on the review 
panel.29 
These periodic reviews, which have become a legal requirement for the most 
recently established RFMOs, 30  are not only an important tool for assessing the 
effectiveness of fisheries measures adopted within a particular region, but they are also 
a way of considering best practices from other regional settings, thus contributing to 
the systematization of regional fisheries governance.  
 
 
3. INSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF REGIONAL FISHERIES BODIES 
 
The Fish Stocks Agreement makes a distinction between cooperation that is carried out 
“directly or through appropriate subregional or regional fisheries management 
                                                 
25  See M. Ceo et al “Performance Reviews by Regional Fisheries Bodies: Introduction, Summaries, 
Synthesis and Best Practices” (FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular No. 1072: 2012) 43; P.D. 
Szigeti and G. Lugten “The Implementation of Performance Reviews Reports by Regional Fisheries 
Bodies, 2004-2014” (FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular No. 1108: 2013) 6. 
26  This was the case for the first NEAFC Performance Review in 2006. This model was followed by, 
inter alia, the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), 
the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), the South-East Atlantic Fisheries 
Organization (SEAFO), the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), and the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries Organization (NAFO). 
27  The International Commission on the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) was the first body 
to establish a completely independent review panel in 2008 and it has been followed by, inter alia, 
NEAFC in its second review, the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM), 
and (to some extent) the Commission on the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT). The 
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) employed an independent consultancy to 
conduct its review. 
28  See Report of the NAFO Performance Review virtual Working Group, doc. NAFO/GCDoc.16/02 
(2016) 3. 
29  See e.g. Terms of Reference and Criteria to Conduct the Performance Review of the Indian Ocean 
Tuna Commission (2014); Report of the Thirty-Fifth Meeting of CCAMLR (2016) Annex 8. 
30  Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South 
Pacific Ocean of 14 November 2009 (SPRFMO Convention; available at www.sprfmo.int), Art. 30; 
2012 Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fisheries Resources in the 
North Pacific Ocean of 24 February 2012 (NPFC Convention; available at https://www.npfc.int/), 
Art. 22. 
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organizations and arrangements”.31 Whilst it reserves the option for direct cooperation, 
the Agreement goes on to specify that States are under an obligation to “cooperate to 
establish such an organization or enter into other appropriate arrangements” where one 
does not already exist.32 Such a duty to cooperate can only practically operate as an 
obligation of conduct, not an obligation of result,33 but it nevertheless sets a clear 
preference for more institutionalized forms of cooperation. This preference is also 
reflected in subsequent international fisheries policy documents. 34  Yet, these 
instruments still leave a choice for States between cooperation through an RFMO or an 
RFMA and it is therefore pertinent to consider the key differences between these 
institutional forms.  
 The Fish Stocks Agreement does not expressly define an RFMO, but there are three 
key features that are at the core of any international organization. Firstly, the 
establishment of an organization implies a minimum degree of institutionalization, 
including distinct legal personality.35 An organization will thus be subject to the rules 
of international law, including principles of international institutional law, which define 
the scope of powers that may be exercised by an organization. In particular, this branch 
of international law can be used to determine whether or not an international 
organization is able to regulate matters that are incidental to its main functions,36 as 
well as the existence of implied powers that may be necessary to the achievement of its 
objectives.37 Secondly, all RFMOs will also have some form of permanent organ that 
exercises decision-making powers on behalf of its Members.38 In practice, it is common 
for RFMOs to have a complex structure of organs and sub-organs, each exercising 
different functions. Finally, an organization will have a secretariat that arranges 
meetings and oversees the day-to-day operation of the organization on behalf of the 
membership. In this regard, modern international relations scholarship posits that the 
establishment of a secretariat, separate from the individual Members, has significant 
effects on the dynamics of international law-making by providing “relatively unbiased 
information to all”,39 thereby “influencing how problems are framed and discussed.”40 
Indeed, the secretariat may also be ascribed certain functions in relation to 
implementation and oversight of agreed CMMs, including bringing instances of 
infractions to the attention of the relevant organs of the RFMO. This is a possibility that 
is often neglected in the context of regional fisheries management, however, and 
performance reviews have sometimes recommended that certain aspects of the 
secretariat should be strengthened in order to provide better support to reviewing 
compliance with CMMs.41  
                                                 
31  Art. 8(1). 
32  Ibid, Art. 8(5). See also UNGA Res.71/123, note 16, at para. 140. 
33  See e.g. Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland (1931) PCIJ Reports, Series A/B, 108, 116. 
34  See e.g. Code of Conduct, note 11 at, para. 7.1.3. 
35  See e.g. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations, Art. 2(a).  
36  See e.g. Advisory Opinion on the Competence of the International Labour Organization to Regulate, 
Incidentally, the Personal Work of the Employer (1926) PCIJ Reports, Series B, No. 13, 6. 
37  See e.g. Advisory Opinion on Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations 
(1949) ICJ Reports 174. 
38  See e.g. H.G. Schermers and N.M. Blokkers International Institutional Law (3rd ed.: Brill, Leiden: 
1995) 23. 
39  J. Alvarez International Organizations as Law-Makers (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2005) 
341. 
40  E.M. Hafner-Burton, D.G. Victor and Y. Lupu “Political Science Research on International Law: 
The State of the Field” (2012) 106 American Journal of International Law 47-97, 57. 
41  Report of the 2014 NEAFC Performance Review, 99. 
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 The concept of a RFMA implies a lesser degree of institutionalization. The Fish 
Stocks Agreement defines such an arrangement as:  
 
a cooperative mechanism established in accordance with the Convention and this 
Agreement by two or more States for the purpose, inter alia, of establishing [CMMs] in a 
subregion or region for one or more straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks.42  
 
This concept is a broad one and it potentially covers a range of different forms of 
cooperation. On the one hand, it would cover non-binding mechanisms agreed between 
relevant fishing states. This form of arrangement is most common as a means of 
promulgating interim measures, either pending the conclusion of a treaty or pending its 
entry into force. For example, the states and entities negotiating the North Pacific 
Fisheries Convention agreed in February 2007 to the adoption of (non-legally binding) 
interim measures for the North-East Pacific and the North-West Pacific, pending the 
conclusion of a treaty for this region. These interim measures were revised a number of 
times during their lifetime, demonstrating that such arrangements can evolve over time 
to reflect new developments. Nevertheless, this sort of arrangement can clearly be 
distinguished from an RFMO because there is no permanent body with legal personality 
responsible for overseeing the development of the measures.  
 At the same time, the term ‘arrangement’ could also include a legally binding 
agreement on applicable decision-making procedures that falls short of establishing a 
formal international organization. The Central Bering Sea (CBS) Convention 43 
provides an example of such an arrangement in practice. This treaty aims to “establish 
an international regime for conservation, management and optimum utilization of 
Pollock resources in the Convention Area”, 44  which operates through an “Annual 
Conference of the Parties”45 held in rotation among the Parties.46 The conference is also 
supported by a Scientific and Technical Committee, demonstrating that even a RFMA 
can encompass a more complex institutional structure. One reason for choosing this 
model was to reduce cost for the Parties, as there is no need for a permanent 
headquarters or a secretariat.47 Yet, it is possible for such an arrangement to make 
provision for an independent secretariat, as one sees in the Southern Indian Ocean 
Fisheries (SIOF) Agreement.48 Indeed, it has been argued elsewhere that this type of 
autonomous institutional arrangement should be treated as international organizations, 
subject to the rules of international institutional law,49 thus blurring the distinction with 
a formal international organization. This observation means that it is more important to 
                                                 
42  Art. 1(1)(d). 
43  Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea 
of 16 June 1994 (34 ILM 67). 
44  Art. II(1). 
45  Ibid., Art. III(1)(a). 
46  Ibid,. Art. VI(1). Indeed, since 2010, the Parties have held a virtual conference; see 
<http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/refm/cbs/>. 
47  See D.A. Balton “The Bering Sea Doughnut Hole Convention: Regional Solution, Global 
Implications” in O.S. Stokke (ed.) Governing High Seas Fisheries (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford: 2001) 158. See also E.J. Molenaar, “Addressing Regulatory Gaps in High Seas Fisheries” 
(2005) 20 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 533, 545.  
48  Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement of 7 July 2006 (available at www.fao.org/legal), Art. 
9. 
49  See R. Churchill and G. Ulfstein “Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements” (2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 623, 633. 
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consider the detailed functioning of an organization or arrangement, rather than its 
formal designation or status.50 
 
 
4. RFMO/A DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES  
 
RFMO/As are established with the primary aim of conferring the power to make 
decisions relating to the conservation and management of fish stocks, including 
decisions relating to fishing levels, catch allocation, and other CMMs. Decision-making 
procedures are a key aspect of negotiations related to the establishment of a regional 
fisheries treaty, as the precise parameters of these procedures will determine how much 
control States give up over fishing opportunities and how much influence States have 
over the decision-making process within the institution.  
 The Fish Stocks Agreement has emphasized the importance of transparent, timely 
and effective decision-making procedures within RFMO/As. 51  These requirements 
have been reiterated by the 2016 Resumed FSA Review Conference, which encouraged 
RFMO/As to review their decision-making procedures in order to facilitate the adoption 
of CMMs in a timely and effective manner.52 The importance of timeliness in the 
context of fisheries management is self-explanatory. The pursuit of effectiveness is 
more complex and there is a balance to be achieved between the ambition of adopting 
decisions on the one hand, and their widespread acceptance on the other hand. In 
practice, decision-making procedures are the product of political compromises between 
the States involved in the negotiations. It follows that there is no single model of 
decision-making.53  Indeed, decision-making procedures often contain a number of 
elements, which must be considered side-by-side in order to understand the degree to 
which Members are constrained. 
 At one end of the spectrum lie those organizations that operate on the basis of 
unanimity or consensus, such as the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission 
(IATTC). The IATTC Convention54 provides that, unless otherwise agreed,55 decisions 
of the IATTC shall be made by consensus,56 which is defined as “the adoption of a 
decision without voting and without the expression of any stated objection.”57 Whilst 
consensus is ordinarily to be distinguished from unanimity, the lack of an alternative 
voting procedure means that consensus in this context is very close to unanimity. 
Indeed, the Convention even provides an opportunity for States that were not able to 
attend the meeting to block the consensus within a certain time-period.58 Other treaties 
                                                 
50  See further Section 2 of Chapter 6 of this Volume (Molenaar). 
51  Fish Stocks Agreement, note 7 at Arts. 10(j) and 12. See also Art. 28. 
52  Report of the 2016 Resumed FSA Review Conference, note 164, at para. B5(d). 
53  See T.L. McDorman “Implementing Existing Tools: Turning Words into Actions – Decision-
making processes of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs)” (2005) 20 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 423, 427. 
54  Convention for the Strengthening of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission Established by 
the 1949 Convention Between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica of 14 
November 2003 (commonly known as the ‘Antigua Convention’; available at www.iattc.org). 
55  The Convention further specifies those issues where consensus is always required. 
56  Art. IX(1). 
57  Ibid., Art. I(5). 
58  Ibid., Art. IX(4) and (5). 
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are more explicit in requiring unanimity prior to a decision being adopted.59 The two 
main RFMAs also operate by consensus.60  
 It has been recognized that consensus decision-making has advantages and 
disadvantages. Thus, it has been argued that “decisions reached by consensus were 
preferable as they enjoyed greater levels of support and compliance when 
implemented.”61  Furthermore, as noted by the performance review of the IATTC, 
“consensus is the most egalitarian, collaborative decision-making model”, but it also 
has drawbacks, as it “tends to support the status quo and impede change.”62 From this 
perspective, consensus has been criticized as coming at the cost of “lowest common 
denominator outcomes and, in some cases, only after prolonged debate leading to non-
timeliness of adoption of management measures.”63 Ultimately, this form of decision-
making means that all States must consent to a new measure and thus any single State 
can veto a decision. This can lead to delays in decision-making, but evidence on this 
point is mixed. In the 2008 performance review of the Commission on the Conservation 
of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), the panel noted that:  
 
Consensus has worked for CCAMLR over a long period of time […] The need for 
consensus on matters of substance has not prevented CCAMLR from addressing any 
important issues.64  
 
However, the operation of consensus decision-making procedures will in practice 
depend on the number of Members and their diversity of interests.65 
 At the other end of the spectrum lie those organizations that make provision for 
qualified majority voting. Required majorities vary from two-thirds of Members 
present and voting66 to three-quarters of Members casting an affirmative or negative 
vote.67 When a vote is taken, such decisions are often also subject to a quorum.68  
                                                 
59  Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna of 10 May 1993 (CCSBT Convention; 
1819 UNTS 359), Art. 7. This treaty only requires unanimity of Members present at the meeting. 
See also the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources in the South 
East Atlantic Ocean of 10 April 2001 (SEAFO Convention; 2221 UNTS 189), Art. 17(1), and the 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources of 20 May 1980 (CAMLR 
Convention; 1329 UNTS 47), Art. XII(1). 
60  CBS Convention, note 43 at, Art. V. Balton, note 47 at 158-159 suggests that other decision-making 
procedures were discussed in the course of the negotiations. See also the SIOF Agreement, note 48 
at Art. 8. 
61  Report of the Meeting of FAO and Non-FAO Regional Fishery Bodies or Arrangements, note 13 at 
para. 36. 
62  Report of the 2016 IATTC Performance Review, 9. 
63  McDorman, note 53 at 429.  
64  Report of the 2008 CCAMLR Performance Review, 81. See also the comments in the Report of the 
2010 SEAFO Performance Review, 40 noting that while the “consensus approach to decision-
making may effectively weaken the final outcome in some cases, this has not been apparent in 
SEAFO practice.” 
65  See discussion in the Report of the 2016 ICCAT Performance Review, 50. 
66  International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas of 14 May 1966 (ICCAT 
Convention; 673 UNTS 63, as amended; consolidated version available at www.iccat.int), Art. 
VIII(1)(b); Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries 
(NEAFC Convention; 1285 UNTS 129, as amended; consolidated version available at 
www.neafc.org), Art. 3(9); and Agreement for the Establishment of the General Fisheries Council 
for the Mediterranean (GFCM Agreement; 126 UNTS 239, as amended; consolidated version 
available at www.fao.org/legal/treaties/treaties-under-article-xiv/en/), Art. XIII(1). 
67  SPRFMO Convention, note 30 at Art. 16(2); NPFC Convention, note 30 at Art. 8(2). 
68  E.g. NPFC Convention, note 30 at Art. 8(4). 
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 An even more complex decision-making procedure is found in the Western and 
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) Convention, which distinguishes 
between decisions relating to allocation and decisions relating to CMMs. The former 
must be adopted by consensus,69 whereas the latter require a three-quarters majority 
including three-quarters of the Members of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency 
(FFA) and three-quarters of non-Members of the FFA. 70  This qualified majority 
demonstrates how decision-making procedures are often tailored to the particular 
circumstances of a region.  
 Many agreements seek to reconcile these two positions and adopt a middle ground, 
by demanding that an effort is made to seek consensus prior to the casting of a vote.71 
The decision as to when a vote is possible is often granted to the Chairperson. In the 
case of the WCPFC, the Chair is granted the power to appoint a conciliator for the 
purpose of reconciling the differences between Members that may be blocking 
consensus.72 Consensus may also be adopted as a decision-making practice, even if it 
is not formally recognized in the constituent instrument of an RFMO. Thus, the 
International Commission on the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) has a 
practice of deferring decisions until consensus can be achieved, even though its 
constituent instrument allows for majority voting.73 Similarly, NEAFC Members have 
agreed through their rules of procedure that “the Commission shall endeavor to make 
decisions on the basis of consensus.”74 However, it is less clear in these circumstances 
when recourse can be had to a vote. Given that the constituent instrument provides for 
a vote without the requirement to exhaust efforts to reach consensus, it would seem that 
any contracting party may demand a vote at any time.75 As a result, the dynamics of 
negotiations may be subtly different from those organizations in which the limits of 
consensus decision-making are pre-defined.  
 Whilst those treaties containing provisions for voting may seem to suggest a move 
away from traditional consensual law-making, it must also be understood that most 
treaties grant States the option to object to decisions within a certain time period after 
they have been adopted in accordance with the applicable decision-making 
requirements, which prevents that decision from becoming binding on that State.76 
These procedures thus retain some element of consent in the decision-making process. 
Such opt-out procedures may even apply if a measure has been adopted by consensus.77 
An important feature of the opt-out procedures is that States must object within a 
specific timeframe, which varies from 50 days78 to six months.79 However, an objection 
by one State can trigger a new period for other States to reconsider their options and 
                                                 
69  Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western 
and Central Pacific Ocean of 5 September 2000 (WCPFC Convention; 2275 UNTS 43), Art. 10(4). 
70  Ibid., Art. 20(2). 
71  E.g. ibid., Art. 20(3), whereby the Chair “shall fix a time during that session of the Commission for 
taking the decision by a vote” but the parties may by a simple majority decide to defer the question 
to a later time. 
72  Ibid., Art. 20(2). 
73  The delay caused by postponing decision-making in an effort to achieve consensus was criticized in 
the Report of the 2016 ICCAT Performance Review, 2. 
74  NEAFC Rules of Procedure, para. 22.  
75  See the Report of the 2014 NEAFC Performance Review,105 where the Panel recommends a 
provision specifying that decisions by voting would only be taken after all efforts to reach consensus 
have been exhausted. See also the Report of the 2011 GFCM Performance Review, 78-79. 
76  See e.g. NEAFC Convention, note 66 at, Art. 12(2). 
77  SEAFO Convention, note 3059 at, Arts. 17(1) and 23; CAMLR Convention, note 59 at, Art. 9(6).  
78  See NEAFC Convention, note 66 at, Art. 12(a). 
79  See ICCAT Convention, note 66 at, Art. VIII(3). 
JAMES HARRISON 
 10 
make their own objection. Moreover, the constituent instruments of some RFMOs 
allow a Member to terminate its acceptance of a recommendation after a fixed period 
of time, usually one year.80 
 In practice, objection procedures are widely used81 and they have been criticized 
for undermining the effectiveness of measures adopted by RFMOs.82 The inclusion of 
such procedures must be understood against the backdrop of the international legal 
framework for the regulation of fisheries and the historical freedom to fish on the high 
seas. Thus, as noted by Fitzmaurice 
 
arguably, opt-out procedures have encouraged States to sign up to conventions which they 
might otherwise have been reluctant to join because of the possibility of finding themselves 
bound by onerous provisions on the basis of majority decisions in the convention’s 
organs.83  
 
From this perspective, failure to accommodate diverse views within the decision-
making procedure could lead some States to withdraw from the organization 
completely; most RFMOs allow withdrawal after a notice period has been served.84 
Whether such arguments continue to provide strong grounds to support the inclusion of 
the opt-out procedure can be debated, however, in light of further developments in 
international fisheries law. For Parties to the Fish Stocks Agreement in particular, the 
situation would appear to have changed, as the Agreement explicitly stipulates: 
 
Only those States which are members of such an organization or participants in such an 
arrangement, or which agree to apply the [CMMs] established by such an organization or 
arrangement, shall have access to the fishery resources to which those measures apply.85  
 
It follows that the right of RFMO members to opt-out of CMMs is no longer about 
ensuring that such States would not be worse off within the organization than outside 
the organization. Rather, as noted by McDorman: 
 
the curiosity of this provision is that [a Party to the Fish Stocks Agreement] may be in a 
better position to avoid the application of an RFMO decision (e.g. by use of an objection 
procedure) as a member of the RFMO, than as a non-member of the RFMO.86  
 
More recent regional fisheries treaties have sought to counter the perceived problem of 
overuse of objection procedures by introducing limits on the ability of a State to make 
                                                 
80  NEAFC Convention, note 66 at, Art. 13(1). 
81  Although their use varies from organization to organization - it has been noted that the objection 
procedure in CCAMLR has only been used twice in 28 years (Report of the 2008 CCAMLR 
Performance Review, 82). See also the comments in the Report of the 2010 SEAFO Performance 
Review, 40 noting that the objection procedure had not been invoked at the time of writing. 
82  See discussion in D. Diz Fisheries Management in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction: The Impact 
of Ecosystem Based Law-Making (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden: 2013) 128. 
83  M. Fitzmaurice Whaling and International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2015) 64. 
84  E.g. SPRFMO Convention, note 30 at, Art. 41 requires one year’s notice; NPFC Convention, note 
30 at, Art. 31 requires six months’ notice. 
85  Art. 8(4). Whether or not this reflects customary international law is controversial. 
86  McDorman, note 53 at 426, footnote 8. McDorman also suggests that “implicitly the obligation on 
UNFSA parties not to undermine RFMO measures can be seen as possibly providing a constraint 
on an UNFSA party using an RFMO objection procedure” (430) but this interpretation is not 
supported by practice. See, for example, the discussion below on Russia’s objection under the 
SPRFMO Convention, despite it being a Party to the Fish Stocks Agreement.  
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objections to CMMs. To this end, the 2016 Resumed FSA Review Conference 
encouraged RFMOs to  
 
ensure that post opt out behavior is constrained by rules to prevent opting-out parties from 
undermining conservation, by establishing clear processes for dispute settlement and for 
the adoption of alternative measures with equivalent effect that would be implemented in 
the interim.87 
 
In response to this pressure, some RFMOs have done away with objection procedures 
altogether. Thus, the WCPFC Convention replaces the ability to opt-out with a power 
to “seek a review of the decision by a review panel.”88 If the panel finds that the 
decision is discriminatory or incompatible with the WCPFC Convention, the LOS 
Convention or the Fish Stocks Agreement, it may recommend to the Commission that 
the decision is modified, amended or revoked and the Commission is obliged to take 
action thereon.89  
 Alternatively, regional fisheries treaties have sought to control the exercise of 
objections. A leading example is the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management 
Organization (SPRFMO) Convention, which provides that 
 
the only admissible grounds for an objection are that the decision unjustifiably 
discriminates in form or in fact against the member of the Commission, or is inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Convention or other relevant international law as reflected in 
[the LOS Convention or the Fish Stocks Agreement].90  
 
This provision thus limits the discretion of a Member as to the reasons for making an 
objection. In addition, the Convention requires an objecting State to advise the 
Executive Secretary of “alternative measures that are equivalent in effect to the decision 
to which it has objectives and have the same date of application.”91 In other words, 
Members cannot escape regulation completely. Indeed, the SPRFMO Convention goes 
further by providing that any objection is automatically considered by an independent 
review panel with a mandate to decide whether the objection is permissible and, if so, 
whether the proposed alternative measures are equivalent.92 This procedure thus further 
limits the possibility of abuse of the objection procedure by introducing an element of 
independent scrutiny.  
 This innovative procedure was invoked for the first time in 201393 in order to 
address an objection presented by the Russian Federation to SPRFMO’s CMM 1.01 
relating to Trachurus murphyi. Ultimately, the Review Panel upheld the permissibility 
of the objection, but went on to find that the alternative measure proposed by Russia 
was not equivalent because it could affect the allocations given to other Members.94 
                                                 
87  Report of the 2016 Resumed FSA Review Conference, note 164 at para. B5(b). 
88  WCPFC Convention, note 69 at, Art. 20(6) 
89  Ibid., Art. 20(9). As noted by McDorman, note 53 at 432: “the modification of the decision could 
include non-application of the decision to the state as an alternative to revocation of the decision 
and, in this way, an “opt-out” equivalent to the results of an objection procedure may arise”. 
90  SPRFMO Convention, note 30 at, Art. 17(2)(c).  
91  Ibid., Art. 17(2)(b)(ii). 
92  Ibid., Art. 17(5) and Annex II. 
93  Findings and Recommendations of the Review Panel, 5 July 2013 (available at 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2082).   
94  For a more detailed discussion, see A. Serdy “Implementing Article 28 of the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement: The First Review of a Conservation Measure in the South Pacific Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisation” (2016) 47 Ocean Development and International Law 1-28. 
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The Panel therefore recommended a different alternative measure, which would allow 
Russia to authorize its vessels to fish in the Convention Area only after Russia had 
determined that the total catch in 2013 will not reach the overall TAC and only until 
this limit is reached.95 The Review Panel’s report reads largely like a legal decision, 
turning on legal concepts of discrimination and compatibility with the relevant treaties. 
Indeed, the process itself resembles in some respects arbitration, and two of the 
nominated panelists were in fact taken from the list of arbitrators held by FAO under 
Article 2 of Annex VIII to the LOS Convention, with the chair being an expert in the 
law of the sea. Moreover, despite being designated as “recommendations”, it would 
appear that States must comply or choose to initiate dispute settlement proceedings 
under the SPRFMO Convention.96  
 The SPRFMO Convention is the only regional fisheries treaty to automatically 
trigger an independent review of objections, but other regions have introduced similar 
restraints on the use of objections that would allow questions of compatibility to be 
submitted to either an ad hoc expert panel97 or to international dispute settlement.98 
Some of the older treaties have similarly adopted amendments to treaties99 or to the 
applicable rules of procedure100 in order to increase oversight of objection procedures. 
Given the specific circumstances of each regional fishery, it is unlikely that a single 
model will be appropriate for all of them. Nevertheless, the quasi-judicial nature of 
these emerging procedures could raise expectations of the development of a 
jurisprudence concerning the interpretation of the common terms related to the validity 
of objections, as well as the concept of equivalence, which may be applicable across 
the various new regimes. If this were to happen, it would be a further indicator of an 
emergent system of RFMOs, all subject to similar principles of operation. 
 
 
5. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
 
Another feature of the increasing institutionalization of regional fisheries cooperation 
is the inclusion of ever more complex and varied third-party dispute settlement 
mechanisms. Fishing has traditionally been a subject that has provoked litigation 
between States.101 Nevertheless, many early regional fisheries treaties did not provide 
for the compulsory settlement of disputes. 102  For example, neither the NAFO 
                                                 
95  In reality, the decision was a chimeric victory for the Russian Federation as it ended up with zero 
catch in 2013, although it has since been allocated a share of the TAC (SPRFMO CMM 4.01 (2016)).  
96  SPRFMO Convention, note 30 at, Annex II, para. 10. 
97  SEAFO Convention, note 59 at, Art. 23(g) – such a request is made pending a review by the 
Commission. See discussion in H.S. Schiffman Marine Conservation Agreements: The Law and 
Policy of Reservations and Vetoes (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden: 2008) 201-202. 
98  NPFC Convention, note 30 at, Art. 9(c). 
99  See e.g. NAFO Convention (Convention on Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries - 
originally named ‘Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries’ - of 24 October 1978 (1135 UNTS 369, as amended; consolidated version available at 
www.nafo.int)), Art. XIV. 
100  NEAFC Rules of Procedure, para. 41 (not in force at the time of writing). The legal status of this 
new arrangement is not clear. See also the discussion in the Report of the 2016 ICCAT Performance 
Review, 57. 
101  See e.g. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (1951) ICJ Reports 116; Icelandic Fisheries Case (1974) 
ICJ Reports 175; and Canada-Spain Fisheries Case (1998) ICJ Reports 432. 
102  The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas of 29 April 
1958 (559 UNTS 285) did provide for the settlement of disputes by an expert commission, although 
the treaty was not widely accepted, with only 37 ratifications. 
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Convention nor the NEAFC Convention originally contained a dispute settlement 
clause. Some of the other earlier regional treaties do contain dispute settlement clauses 
but they condition the submission of a dispute upon the consent of both of the interested 
parties and only after attempts at conciliation have failed.103 Such procedures have been 
described as “weak” and “unsatisfactory.”104 
 Nevertheless, attitudes towards compulsory settlement for high seas fisheries 
disputes have strengthened since the conclusion and entry into force of the LOS 
Convention, which allows such disputes, at least as they relate to the high seas portion 
of a fishery,105 to be submitted to one of the compulsory procedures contained in Part 
XV of the Convention. The LOS Convention emphasizes freedom of choice concerning 
the forum for dispute settlement,106  but if States cannot agree on a mechanism, it 
provides for arbitration of disputes by default.107 The Fish Stocks Agreement further 
encourages this trend by requiring parties to “promote the peaceful settlement of 
disputes.” 108  The Agreement provides for the consensual submission of technical 
disputes to an ad hoc panel of experts. 109  Otherwise, disputes concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Agreement may be submitted to the compulsory 
dispute settlement procedures in the LOS Convention. 110  Indeed, the Fish Stocks 
Agreement goes further and allows “disputes between States Parties to [the] Agreement 
concerning the interpretation and application of a subregional, regional or global 
fisheries agreement relating to straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks to 
which they are parties” to be submitted to the procedures set out in Part XV of the LOS 
Convention. 111  This innovative clause would compensate for the lack of dispute 
settlement provisions in some regional fisheries treaties, if the disputants are Parties to 
the Fish Stocks Agreement.112 Nevertheless, limited participation in the Agreement 
means that it does not fully address this issue.113 It is particularly unclear whether the 
dispute settlement provisions under the Fish Stocks Agreement can be utilized to 
challenge a measure adopted by an RFMO with Members who are not party to the Fish 
Stocks Agreement.114 If not, this would be very limiting indeed.  
 In practice, it is increasingly common to find compulsory dispute settlement in 
modern regional fisheries treaties. Amendments to this end have been adopted for many 
                                                 
103  GFCM Agreement, note 66 at, Art. 19; CAMLR Convention, note 59 at, Art. XXV. 
104  Report of the 2008 CCAMLR Performance Review, 84. See also the criticism in the Report of the 
2011 GFCM Performance Review, 79-80. 
105  Exclusive economic zone (EEZ) fisheries disputes are excluded from compulsory dispute settlement 
(see LOS Convention, note 1 at Art. 297). According to A.E. Boyle “Problems of Compulsory 
Jurisdiction and the Settlement of Disputes relating to Straddling Fish Stocks” in O.S. Stokke (ed) 
Governing High Seas Fisheries (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2001) 100, 113, however, the 
exception should be construed narrowly to cover fisheries issues that exclusively relate to the EEZ. 
But, as he himself notes, this is not the natural meaning of the language.  
106  LOS Convention, note 1 at Art. 280. 
107  Ibid., Art. 287 and Annex VII.  
108  Fish Stocks Agreement, note 7 at Art. 10(k). 
109  Ibid., Art. 29. 
110  Ibid., Art. 30. 
111  Ibid., Art. 30. 
112  See the discussion of various interpretations of this provision in Boyle, note 105 at 111. He 
concludes that “the [better view is] that, as between parties to the Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 
30(2) amends existing fishery treaties and incorporates into them the disputes settlement provisions 
of part XV of the 1982 UNCLOS”. 
113  For a discussion of the reasons for non-participation, see E.J. Molenaar, ‘Non-Participation in the 
Fish Stocks Agreement: Status and Reasons’ (2011) 26 International Journal of Marine and Coastal 
Law 195-234. 
114  McDorman, note 53 at 440. 
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existing RFMOs, including for NEAFC in 2004 and for NAFO in 2007, although entry 
into force of these provisions has been slow and the NEAFC amendments remain 
pending. Most other treaties negotiated after the adoption of the Fish Stocks Agreement 
have dispute settlement clauses within them, whether they establish an RFMO or an 
RFMA.115 As with the global instruments, the regional treaties reflect the principle of 
freedom of choice,116 followed by reference to two main types of dispute settlement 
procedures, mirroring the relevant provisions of the Fish Stocks Agreement.117  
 Firstly, these treaties often provide for the use of expert panels for technical 
disputes. For example, the SEAFO Convention provides: 
 
In cases where a dispute between two or more Contracting Parties is of a technical nature, 
and the Contracting Parties are unable to resolve the dispute amongst themselves, they may 
refer the dispute to an ad hoc expert panel established in accordance with the procedures 
adopted by the Commission at its first meeting. […]118  
 
There are several features of this procedure which merit further comment. Firstly, the 
procedure would appear to require the consent of both parties. This is confirmed by the 
more detailed procedure agreed by the Commission, which makes clear that “[t]he other 
Contracting Party shall communicate whether it accepts or not [the proposal to submit 
a dispute to an ad hoc expert panel].” In this respect, this procedure is distinct from the 
role of ad hoc expert panels under the objection procedures, where any Contracting 
Party can unilaterally initiate panel proceedings. Secondly, the outcome of the process 
is non-binding. There are no known examples of these procedures being used in practice 
and it has been pointed out that one of their weaknesses is that the scope of what is a 
‘technical dispute’ is highly obscure.119 Nevertheless, such informal procedures could 
be quicker and less costly than the pursuit of litigation.120 
 Most modern regional fisheries treaties also provide for compulsory adjudication 
of disputes. In this respect, the SEAFO Convention,121 the SPRFMO Convention,122 
the (North Pacific Fisheries Commission) (NPFC) Convention,123 and the WCPFC 
Convention124 all provide for disputes to be submitted to the compulsory procedures set 
out in the Fish Stocks Agreement, including compulsory arbitration in situations where 
States do not agree to an alternative forum for settlement. The continuing choice of ad 
hoc arbitration as the residual forum for the settlement of such disputes suggests that 
States prefer to retain flexibility in who should be appointed to decide such disputes.  
 The procedures discussed above both concern the settlement of a dispute between 
two of the Parties concerning the interpretation and application of a relevant treaty. For 
a dispute to exist, there must be “a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of 
legal views or of interests between two persons.”125 There must also be a State that is 
willing to bring a claim, and an identifiable respondent. However, not all legal 
                                                 
115  In the latter context, see SIOF Agreement, note 48 at, Art. 20. 
116  See e.g. SPRMO Convention, note 30 at, Art. 34(1). 
117  Indeed, several agreements simply incorporate in toto Part VIII of the Fish Stocks Agreement; see 
NPFC Convention, note 30 at, Art. 19; SPRMO Convention, note 30 at , Art. 34(2). 
118  SEAFO Convention, note 59 at , Art. 24(3). See also <http://www.seafo.org/SEAFO-Bodies/The-
Commission/Dispute-Settlement>. 
119  See the Report of the 2014 NEAFC Performance Review, 110. 
120  See comments of Boyle, note 105 at 109. 
121  SEAFO Convention, note 59 at, Art. 24.  
122  SPRFMO Convention, note 30 at, Art. 34. 
123  NPFC Convention, note 30 at, Art. 19. 
124  WCPFC Convention, note 69 at, Art. 31. 
125  Mavromattis Palestine Concessions (1924) PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 2, 11.  
KEY CHALLENGES ON THE GOVERNANCE OF REGIONAL FISHERIES 
 15 
disagreements in the regional fisheries context will necessarily have these 
characteristics. An alternative option would be to submit legal questions to an advisory 
process. Advisory opinions can provide useful clarifications on the state or meaning of 
the law, without the need for a formal dispute to arise. Such an approach would make 
use of the ability of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) under 
Article 138 of its Rules of Procedure to “give an advisory opinion on a legal question 
if any international agreement related to the purposes of the Convention specifically 
provides for the submission to the Tribunal of a request for such an opinion.” ITLOS 
confirmed its ability to grant advisory opinions in 2013126 when it received a request 
from the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, one of the few bodies to possess such a 
competence. ITLOS went on to say that “a request for an advisory opinion should not 
in principle be refused except for compelling reasons.”127 It remains to be seen whether 
other RFMOs will be given such a power through continuing reforms of these bodies. 
 
6. INTER-INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION AND COORDINATION  
 
Most RFMO/As are established as autonomous institutions and they are designed in 
order to reflect the particularities of the region and the interests of the States concerned. 
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that lessons can be learned between regional regimes. 
Moreover, in some instances, the effective and efficient management of fish stocks may 
require the involvement of more than one RFMO/A, where they are responsible for 
overlapping or adjacent areas. 
 The power to enter into cooperative arrangements is recognized in the constituent 
instruments of most RFMO/As,128 although it can be argued that this ability could be 
exercised as an implied power in the case of those RFMO/As without an express power. 
In some regional fisheries treaties, specific organizations are expressly identified as 
suitable partners for cooperation,129 whilst leaving open the possibility for cooperation 
with other organizations. Most treaties, however, do not specify the modalities for 
cooperation, simply referring to the need for “suitable arrangements”.130 In practice, 
cooperation operates at two levels. 
 Firstly, individual RFMO/As have entered into ‘bilateral’ arrangements with a view 
to ensuring that they adopt consistent rules in cases where their competence may to 
some extent overlap or where vessels may fish in areas falling under the competence of 
more than one RFMO/A. These practices have become even more important following 
the proliferation of RFMO/As in the past decade.131  
 An example is provided by the relationship between the WCPFC and the IATTC, 
whose areas of competence overlap in the southern central Pacific. The constituent 
instruments of both of these institutions call for cooperation with other relevant 
organizations in order to reach agreement on a consistent set of CMMs.132 The two 
                                                 
126  Fisheries Advisory Opinion (2015) ITLOS Case No. 21, para. 56. For a critical discussion of this 
decision, see T. Ruys and A. Soete “Creeping Advisory Jurisdiction of International Courts and 
Tribunals?” (2015) 29 Leiden Journal of International Law 1-22.  
127  Fisheries Advisory Opinion, note 1268 at para. 71. 
128  See e.g. NAFO Convention, note 99 at, Art. XVII(c); GFCM Agreement, note 66 at, Art. 17(1). See 
also SPRFMO Convention, note 30 at , Art. 31(1); NPFC Convention, note 30 at, Art. 21(1). 
129  See e.g .CAMLR Convention, note 59 at, Art. XXIII; WCPFC Convention, note 69 at, Art. 22. 
130  NPFC Convention, note 30 at, Article 21(4). 
131  This will be a consideration in the negotiation of a new agreement for the Central Arctic Ocean, 
discussed above, which may include areas that are already under the competence of NEAFC. 
132  WCPFC Convention, note 69 at, Art. 22; Antigua Convention, note 54 at , Art. 24. 
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RFMOs concluded an MOU in 2006 setting out the basic framework for further 
cooperation, identifying both the areas and modalities of cooperation. The MOU calls 
for information-sharing, as well as reciprocal participation in relevant meetings.133 The 
MOU also establishes a consultative meeting between the secretariats of the two 
organizations in order to “review and enhance cooperation”. 134  Further practical 
arrangements were agreed in subsequent instruments. The 2009 Memorandum of 
Cooperation on the Exchange and Release of Data agreed to the exchange of data 
relating to fishing effort and catch (including by-catch); observer reports; monitoring, 
control and surveillance; and unloading, transshipment and port inspections. A further 
step towards greater coordination of measures was taken in 2011 with the conclusion 
of the Memorandum of Cooperation on the Cross-endorsement of Observers, which 
aims to facilitate the operation of vessels that fish in areas falling under the mandate of 
both organizations on the same fishing trip. Most importantly, however, the two 
organizations have reached an agreement on how to deal with vessels that fish in the 
area that falls under both of their competence. Based upon a document jointly prepared 
by the secretariats of the two organizations, the WCPFC and the IATTC each adopted 
a recommendation, whereby they agreed that vessels listed on the WCPFC register will 
apply WCPFC measures, vessels listed on the IATTC register will apply IATTC 
measures, and vessels that appear on both registers will have the option to notify the 
commissions of which set of measures it will follow.135 The organizations also agreed 
to continue working towards a longer-term solution, which could feasibly include 
designating a single organization to regulate fisheries in the area, thus removing the 
overlap. 136  Similar cooperation arrangements have been established between other 
RFMOs in order to harmonize their regimes.137  
 Another area that has seen cooperation taking place is the establishment of joint 
measures to prevent and deter illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Such 
a step was taken by NAFO and NEAFC when they agreed to transmit information 
concerning vessels on their individual IUU vessel lists and this cooperation has since 
been extended to CCAMLR and SEAFO.138 However, such an arrangement does not 
guarantee harmonization of the respective lists. Under the NEAFC Scheme of Control 
and Enforcement, notifications lead to automatic listing of vessels identified by other 
organizations and the relevant rules provide that “[v]essels placed on the [IUU list] in 
accordance with [this procedure] may only be removed if the RFMO which originally 
identified the vessels as having engaged in IUU fishing activity has notified the NEAFC 
Secretary of their removal of the list.”139 In contrast, under the equivalent rules adopted 
by NAFO, a Member has the right to object to the inclusion of a vessel proposed by 
NEAFC on certain grounds, thus preventing it from being listed.140 Indeed, not all 
                                                 
133  The WCPFC has also entered into similar framework arrangements with the North Pacific 
Anadromous Fish Commission (NPAFC), CCAMLR, CCSBT, and IOTC. 
134  2006 MOU, para. 2.2. 
135  IATTC Recommendation on IATTC-WCPFC Overlap Area (2012); WCPFC9 Decision on the 
WCPFC-IATTC Overlap Area (2012). 
136  See IATTC-WCPFC Overlap Area, doc. IATTC-83 INF-B (2012) 5. Alternatively, regulation in the 
overlap area could be divided depending upon the gear type. 
137  See e.g. 2015 MOU between the CCSBT and IOTC for Monitoring Transhipment at Sea by Large-
Scale Tuna Longline Fishing Vessels; 2016 Arrangement between SPRFMO and CCAMLR. See 
also the Report of the 2016 ICCAT Performance Review, 62. 
138  See e.g. NEAFC Scheme of Control and Enforcement (2016), Art. 44(5). 
139  Ibid., Art. 44(6). 
140  NAFO Conservation and Enforcement Measures (2017), Art. 53(4)(d). See also SEAFO System of 
Observation, Inspection, Compliance and Enforcement (2016), Art. 28. 
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RFMOs have even accepted the policy of cross-listing; CCAMLR simply circulates its 
IUU vessel list to other RFMOs but it does not include vessels listed by other RFMOs 
on its own IUU vessel list.141 These examples illustrate the challenges of cooperation 
between organizations with different memberships and internal political dynamics. 
 Secondly, cooperation between RFMOs also takes place at the global level. In this 
context, the FAO has provided an important forum for discussing best practice amongst 
RFMOs. One particular initiative for promoting cooperation between RFMOs is the 
Coordinating Working Party on Fisheries Statistics, which was first established in the 
late 1950s as a body for agreeing on common definitions on fisheries statistics in the 
North Atlantic142 and was later expanded to cover the entire globe.143 Representatives 
of RFMOs also participate in discussions in the Committee on Fisheries (COFI), 
although as observers. A step to improve direct cooperation between RFMOs was taken 
in the late 1990s by establishing a forum for these organizations to meet and discuss 
common challenges. The first meeting of RFMOs took place at FAO headquarters in 
February 1999 and it was agreed that further meetings should be held in conjunction 
with meetings of the COFI.144 In 2005, the name of the arrangement was changed to 
‘Regional Fishery Body Secretariats’ Network’ in order to better reflect the informal 
nature of the meetings, as well as the fact that cooperation continued between 
meetings. 145  The Network has adopted rules of procedure,146  although it has been 
emphasized that it is limited to pursuing administrative coordination, as the RFB 
secretariats are not able to agree upon policy on behalf of their Members.147 This feature 
of the meetings, as well as the heterogeneity of its membership, limits the utility of this 
arrangement.148  
 A more focused approach to cooperation can be seen through the so-called Kobe 
Process of Cooperation between Tuna RFMOs, which began in January 2007. Unlike 
the RFB Secretariats’ Network, the Kobe Process is open to Members and co-operating 
non-Members of RFMOs, as well as other relevant intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs) and NGOs. The first meeting agreed upon key areas to be addressed through 
closer cooperation. One decision of particular interest for present purposes was 
agreement on a common set of criteria for performance reviews, which have been 
implemented by all tuna RFMOs.149 In addition, participants identified four areas of 
technical cooperation that they would actively pursue, namely harmonization and 
improvement of trade-tracking programs, including catch documentation schemes; 
creation of a harmonized list of tuna fishing vessels and a global list of IUU vessels;150 
                                                 
141  CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-07 (2016), para. 23. 
142  FAO Conference Res. 23/59 (1959). 
143  See “FAO, The Coordinating Working Party on Fishery Statistics: Its Origin, Role and Structure” 
(FAO Fisheries Circular No. 903: 1995). 
144  Report of the Meeting of FAO and Non-FAO Regional Fishery Bodies or Arrangements, note 13 at 
para. 41(i). 
145  See Report of the Fourth Meeting of RFMOs (FAO Fisheries Report No. 778: 2005) para. 7. 
146  Albeit on an ad interim basis; see Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Regional Fishery Body 
Secretariats’ Network (FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Report No. 1175: 2014) Appendix 13, 
footnote 1. 
147  In discussion of the rules of procedure for the Network, concerns were raised about having a rule 
relating to decision-making, even though it did expressly say that decisions were non-binding. 
Ultimately, this rule was deleted. 
148  Suggestions to strengthen the Network were not widely supported at the most recent meeting; see 
Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Regional Fishery Body Secretariats’ Network, note 1467 at paras. 
62-78. 
149  See report of the first meeting of the Tuna RFMOs (2007) Appendix 14. 
150  See <http://www.tuna-org.org/GlobalTVR.htm>. 
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harmonization of transshipment control measures; and standardization of the 
presentation form of stock assessment results. Inter-sessional work has been carried out 
on each of these topics and the tuna RFMOs have since met on two further occasions 
in order to review progress. Participants have also established a website in order to 
communicate the results of the cooperation.151 Certainly, cooperation between the tuna 
RFMOs has become more focused, even if progress has not been as rapid as some may 
have wished, and there have been calls to promote greater cooperation of other 
‘sectoral’ RFMO/As through similar joint meetings to share experiences and good 
practices.152 
 It is not only cooperation between RFMO/As that is on the international agenda 
today. The 2016 Resumed FSA Review Conference also called for states to “strengthen 
cooperation and coordination between [RFMO/As] and Regional Seas Conventions and 
Action Plans.”153 Such cross-sectoral cooperation is becoming increasingly important, 
particularly as the mandate of RFMOs is extending to address the effect of fisheries on 
marine biological diversity, meaning that their work overlaps with the work of 
environmental bodies.154  Some RFMOs have already taken steps in this direction, 
particularly NEAFC, which has established a close working relationship with the 
OSPAR Commission 155  under the so-called Collective Arrangement between 
Competent International Organizations on Cooperation and Coordination regarding 
Selected Areas in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction in the North-East Atlantic,156 and 
the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM), which has worked 
closely with the Meetings of Parties to the Barcelona Convention in pursuing an 
ecosystem approach in the Mediterranean.157 Such arrangements have been identified 
as a potential model that could be used in other regions to build inter-sectoral 
cooperation,158 even though regional differences will dictate that adaptations may have 
to be made.159  
                                                 
151  See <http://www.tuna-org.org/>. 
152  See UNGA Res. 71/123, note 164 at paras. 155 (relating to RFMO/As with competence to manage 
straddling stocks) and 156 (relating to RFMO/As with competence to manage deep-sea fisheries). 
In the latter context, see the Record of the meeting of the deep-sea fisheries secretariats contact 
group (2016), attended by representatives of CCAMLR, NAFO, GFCM, NEAFC, NPFC, SEAFO, 
and SPRFMO. 
153  Report of the Resumed Fish Stocks Agreement Review Conference, note 16 at para. B3(b). 
154  See e.g. J.A. Ardron et al “The Sustainable Use and Conservation of Biodiversity in ABNJ: What 
can be achieved using existing international agreements?” (2014) 49 Marine Policy 98, 103. The 
current negotiations towards a new legally binding instrument on the conservation of biological 
diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction is also intended to address this issue. See further 
Chapter 8 of this Volume (Caddell). 
155  The OSPAR Commission was established by the Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic of 22 September 1992 (2354 UNTS 67, as amended; 
available at https://www.ospar.org).  
156  See discussion in S. Asmundsson and E. Corcoran “The Process of Forming a Cooperative 
Mechanism between NEAFC and OSPAR” (UNEP Regional Seas Reports and Studies No. 196: 
2015) 16; D. Johnson “Can Competent Authorities Cooperate for the Common Good: Towards a 
Collective Arrangement for the North-East Atlantic” in P.A. Beckman and A.N. Vylegzhanin (eds) 
Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean (Springer, New York: 2013) 341. 
157  MOU between the UNEP MAP-Barcelona Convention and FAO-GFCM (2012); Draft Elements of 
a Common Strategy among RAC/SPA, GFCM, ACCOBAMS and IUCN-Med, with collaboration of 
MedPAN, doc. UNEP(DEPI)/MED WG.408/17 (2015). 
158  See Johnson, note 1568 at 341; D. Freestone et al “Can Existing Institutions Protect Biodiversity in 
Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction? Experiences from Two Ongoing Processes” (2014) 49 Marine 
Policy 167, 171. 
159  Asmundsson and Corcoran, note 156 at 30. See further Chapter 8 of this Volume (Caddell). 
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 A more radical solution would be the establishment of Integrated Regional Oceans 
Management Organizations, which combine the functions of regional seas bodies and 
regional fisheries bodies.160 However, many authors believe that this is a step too far 
given the heterogeneity of geographical scopes and participation, as well as the 
different constituencies that would need to be brought together.161 The time and effort 
that would be necessary to promote such an agenda could be better spent on making 
more effective use of existing tools. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The past decades have seen considerable effort put into strengthening regional fisheries 
management in order to meet the challenges of promoting sustainable fishing. New 
RFMO/As have been established in order to fill regulatory gaps and existing institutions 
have been modernized to reflect emerging governance principles. Change has 
sometimes been slow, particularly when it relies upon treaty amendment or it has been 
opposed by key States. Nevertheless, the report by the UN Secretary-General to the 
2016 Resumed FSA Review Conference reflected significant developments in relation 
to the issues examined in this Chapter, including “steady progress […] in strengthening 
the mandates and measures of the organizations and arrangements” 162  and “some 
progress […] in constraining opt-out behavior.”163  
 Not only has there been a clear push for reform within individual RFMO/As, but 
overall developments would also appear to support the emergence of a system of 
regional fisheries governance, composed of autonomous yet interconnected 
institutions. Practice suggests that RFMO/As do not operate in clinical isolation, but 
they are increasingly subject to a framework of common principles and shared values. 
Moreover, developments in one region can influence regulatory arrangements 
elsewhere. 
 This trend is evident in part through the practices that inform performance reviews 
of RFMO/As. In its most concrete form, this is illustrated by the agreement amongst 
tuna RFMOs to apply the same performance criteria in their reviews. However, even 
when organizations have adopted their own review criteria, panels have made 
references to global fisheries instruments and the best practices of other RFMOs to 
support their findings and recommendations.164 In some cases, the need to take into 
account best practices has been codified in the constituent instrument of the RFMO 
itself.165 Similarly, in recent consultations aimed at addressing high seas fishing in the 
central Arctic Ocean, participating States agreed to only allow fishing “pursuant to one 
or more regional or subregional fisheries management organizations or arrangements 
                                                 
160  See Global Ocean Commission, From Decline to Recovery: A Rescue Package for the Oceans, 
Report Summary (2016) 16. 
161  See e.g. J. Rochette et al “Regional Oceans Governance Mechanisms: A Review” (2015) 60 Marine 
Policy 9, 17, concluding that “trying to fully integrate the governance system formally rather than 
functionally is but a pipe dream.” 
162  Report of the Secretary-General to the 2016 Resumed FSA Review Conference, doc. 
A/CONF.210/2016/1 of 1 March 2016, para. 157. 
163  Ibid., para. 198. 
164  See e.g. Report of the 2014 NEAFC Performance Review; Report of the 2016 ICCAT Performance 
Review. 
165  SPRFMO Convention, note 30 at, Art. 30(2); see also NPFC Convention, note 30 at, Art. 22. 
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that are or may be established to manage such fishing in accordance with recognized 
international standards.”166  
 The trend towards systematization is also illustrated by the growing cooperation 
between RFMOs. Overlaps are being addressed and adjacent regimes have worked 
towards the harmonization of measures. Yet, practice in this regard demonstrates that 
successful cooperation is largely the result of horizontal engagement, rather than top-
down imposition. There has been some resistance to the development of a formal 
hierarchy, with particular opposition to the idea that the independent RFMOs could be 
reviewed by the FAO or any other global institution.167 Indeed, it is still true that many 
States are keen to stress the independence of RFMOs168 and it is unlikely that any 
formal hierarchy will emerge in the near future. Moreover, entrenched political and 
geographical differences between regions also mean that, despite the obvious 
convergence in regional fisheries management, complete harmonization is unlikely to 
occur. 
 
 
                                                 
166  2015 Oslo Declaration concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central 
Arctic Ocean. See also https://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/rls/269126.htm. 
167  Report of the Fourth Meeting of RFMOs, note 146 at para. 11, where it was underlined that “FAO 
is free to review the work of the FAO RFMOs. However, a review of the non-FAO RFMOs could 
only be initiated by the governing councils of the organizations concerned, although FAO may be 
able to provide assistance in this regard.” 
168  See e.g. the comments reported in Report of the Secretary-General to the 2016 Resumed FSA 
Review Conference, note 1623 at para. 250. 
